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drawal of the notion of a permanent object, there is nothing left but a sequence of feelings, and hence the permanent identity presupposed in the conception of causality disappears. Time, however, the other element implied, seems still to survive. But it is easy to see that, if there is nothing but a series of feelings, there cannot even be a consciousness of these feelings as a series. A self that is only present in each feeling as it arises could not be conscious of feelings as successive, and therefore could never even come to suppose that there are permanent objects, or a series of changes in permanent objects. Such a self, as Kant says, would be as "many-colored" as the feelings; in other words, it would be no self at all, and could have no conscious experience. We are thus brought back to the demonstration of the possibility of experience, as based upon the "synthetical unity of self-consciousness," a demonstration which need not be repeated. Kant's reply to Hume on the question of causality, therefore, amounts briefly to this: causal sequence presupposes the permanent identity of objects; permanent identity implies a sequence in time; temporal succession is possible only if there is a self-identical intelligence, present to all feelings in turn, but identifiable with none of them. Hume cannot deny one of these elements without virtually denying all the rest, and he can give plausibility to his denial of any one of them only by assuming the others; hence, the belief in a real sequence of events cannot be shown to be delusive.¹

KANT'S RELATION TO MODERN PHILOSOPHIC PROGRESS.

READ AT THE KANT CENTENNIAL, AT SARATOGA, JULY 6, 1881, BY JOSIAH ROYCE.

The general law of the progress of human thought is the Law of Parsimony—*i. e.*, of the greatest adaptation of old methods, principles, theories, dogmas, formulæ, terminology, to new needs and to new facts, with the least possible change in the form of these traditional possessions themselves. Even revolutions in

¹ On Hume's doctrine of causality, see Green's *Hume*, pp. 244 ff.

thought often turn out to be reactions in disguise, conservative efforts to substitute for the traditions of the elders some more ancient and authoritative law, not to destroy old truth, but to fulfil it.

This general tendency leads us at present to the study of Kant, with what justice or usefulness only the result can show. And the study of Kant, must imply some notion on our part of the relation that his thought bears to our present progress in philosophic investigation. The following paper undertakes to establish certain theses concerning this matter. The method will consist in the application to certain modern doctrines of tests suggested by Kant's *Kritik*, and in the effort to find by what modification, both of the doctrines now in favor, and of Kant's position itself, we can hope to make the next step in advance in philosophy. The occasion and our limits will confine our hasty sketch to a study of a few purely theoretical questions, and will exclude all direct consideration of the ethical aspect of modern philosophy.

I.—*Kant's Relation to Modern Attempts in Ontology.*

The whole question of the significance of the *Kritik* for modern progress turns on the relation in which the critical philosophy stands to the numerous modern efforts to formulate an Ontology. If any one of these is a success, then the critical philosophy joins the well-filled ranks of the *überwundene Standpunkte*. If none of the efforts can be accepted as good, then progress must consist in a direct development of the Kantian thought. For the rest, in beginning our discussion with the relation of the critical philosophy to ontology, we are but following the bent of most philosophers as well as of the intelligent public. To all such, ontology is the chief philosophic concern. Of the theory of knowledge the general public will barely endure to hear so much as is darkly outlined in an average text-book of logic; but men listen to an ontological speculation, when once they catch the drift of it, with eager interest. There is something dramatic, or often perhaps rather to be called romantic, in an ontology. A vast universe of beings of various perfection, all striving after the highest development, all mimicking more or less divinely the self-contained majesty of the First Mover; or a world of wondrous, fairy Monads, living in a miraculous pre-established harmony; or a tremendous all-

embracing World-Spirit, growing from less to more, unfolding his infinite possibilities, casting down in god-like and terrible irony all he has once builded to build anew grander temples; or even a weary universal Will, dreaming amid the blind warfare of its own existence about Nirvâna and peace; such a doctrine appeals to the fine myth-making spirit that never deserts us. If philosophy has such things to offer us, then philosophy is a game worth playing. But it has always stood in the way of the critical philosophy that the little fragment of an ontology that was retained in it could satisfy nobody's poetical instincts, and could furnish only a cause for complaint to those who regarded it as inconsistent. To quench some craving, Kant kept the Things-in-themselves. But these things-in-themselves pleased no one, appeared very soon to be, as the old *Xenie*¹ very broadly hinted, useless lumber, fit to be sold at auction, and at their best were not shapely enough to be ornamental. If, then, we look at modern post-critical thought in relation to this part of Kant's *Kritik*, we shall see in it a constant effort to correct in Kant's shadowy ontology either the shadowiness of the shades (viz., of the *Dinge an sich*), or else the mistake of assuming them at all. Where are we to-day in this controversy?

Leaving aside for the time the momentous question as to Kant's own theory of the things in themselves, let us first ask ourselves what we to-day have in the way of a philosophical ontology. If our progress seems unsatisfactory, then, possibly, even the vague struggles of Kant in the transcendental darkness with those terrible Noumena may not be uninstrusive.

Among us, as among the thinkers of all ages, opposing ontological hypotheses are warring together. But it is a characteristic of our own time that the most important ontological hypotheses now in favor agree in being monistic in tendency. Monism is, in fact, often mentioned as if it were an invention of the nineteenth century. Such is far from being the case, but there never were so many intelligent and thoroughgoing Monists in the world as there now are. Representative thinkers differ about what may be known or knowable of the nature of this One; but we hear, in

¹ "Da die Metaphysik vor Kurzem unbeerbt abging Werden die Dinge an sich Morgen *sub hasta* verkauft."

almost wearisome repetition, of Matter and Spirit, of Force and Intelligence, of Motion and Sensation, as being opposite aspects, or faces, or manifestations of one ultimate Reality, until we wonder whether clear thinking is not in danger of losing itself altogether in the contemplation of a mere empty form of words. From whispers and low mutterings with bated breath about the inscrutable mystery of the ultimate unity of Being, one turns with satisfaction to efforts towards some intelligible account of the sense in which all things can be regarded as manifestations of one power or actual Existent. Yet even these efforts have thus far failed to satisfy the demands of criticism. Where they are clearly stated they are inadequate. Where they resort to figures of speech and tell us about the two sides of the shield, or the convexity and concavity of the same curve, as illustrations of the ultimate oneness of nature amid the various manifestations of experience, there these efforts merely sink back into the primitive incoherency so dear to all dogmatic metaphysics. The same curve is, indeed, convex and concave; but matter and spirit are simply not the two faces of a curve, and the relevant circumstance on which this metaphor turns will never be clear to us until we learn, quite literally, wholly apart from fables about shields, just how, in what sense, and by what evidence, matter and mind are known to be of like substance. The failure of dogmatic Monism, if it should take place, ought, indeed, not to throw us over into the arms of an equally dogmatic Dualism; but we must refuse to accept the monistic hypothesis until it has been freed from all trace of mysticism.

How shall this be done? Let us begin with the attempts that have been made to interpret the results of modern physical science in a monistic sense, by regarding the ultimate physical or chemical units as endowed with some form of actual or potential consciousness. Organisms of the highest sort are combinations of atoms. The whole is the sum of its parts. Why may not the mental possessions of these highest organisms be the sum of the indefinitely small mental powers of the atoms? An atom in motion may be a thought, or, if that be saying far too much of so simple a thing, an atom in motion may be, or may be endowed with, an infinitesimal consciousness. Billions of atoms in interaction may have as their resultant quite a respectable little consciousness?

Sufficiently complex groups of these atoms of Mind-Stuff (to use Professor Clifford's ingenious terminology) might produce a great man. One shudders to think of the base uses to which the noble mind-stuff of Shakespeare might return; but the theory tries to be an expression of natural phenomena, not merely an æsthetic creation, and must not pause before such consequences.

Such is an outline that will suggest to the initiated thoughts common to several modern theories of being. Are these theories in a fair way to satisfy critical needs? The writer is not satisfied that they are. Time does not permit any lengthy discussion of the matter here, but let us remind ourselves of the considerations that a study of Kant will most readily suggest to any one that is disposed for a moment to accept one of these modern forms of monism.

Can consciousness be regarded as an aggregate of elementary facts, such as sensations or as atoms of pleasure and pain? If so, what aggregate of sensations forms a judgment, such as, "This man is my father?" Evidently here is indeed an aggregate of sensations represented, but also something more. What is this more? A product, it may be said, formed through association from innumerable past experiences. Granted for the moment; but the question is not as to the origin of this consciousness, but as to its analysis. This act of consciousness, whereby a present sensation is regarded as in definite relation to real past experiences, as a symbol, not merely of actual sensations now remembered, not merely of future sensations not yet experienced, but of a reality wholly outside of the individual consciousness, this act of acknowledging something not directly presented as nevertheless real—is this act of judgment possibly to be regarded as a mere aggregate of elementary mental states? Surely, at best, the act can be so regarded only in the sense in which a word is an aggregate of letters. For and in the one simple momentary consciousness, all these elements exist as an aggregate, but as an aggregate formed into one whole, as the matter of a single act. But in themselves, without the very act of unity in which they are one, these elements would be merely an aggregate, or, in Mr. Gurney's apt words, "a rope of sand." Consciousness, then, as a continual

¹ *Mind* for April, 1881, article, "Monism."

synthesis of innumerable elements into the unity of active judgment, is more than an aggregate, and can never be explained as an aggregate of elementary atoms of sensation.

Nor may we say that the ultimate atomic states of consciousness may be, as it were, chemically united into a whole that is more than an aggregate. Physical atoms in space, if endowed with sufficiently numerous affinities, may unite into what wholes you will; but a mental fact is a mental fact, and no more. An ultimate independent unit of consciousness, conceived after the analogy of a sensation, can have to another like unit only one of three relations. It may coexist with this other unit, or it may precede or follow it in time. There is no other relation possible. Affinity, or attraction, or approach of one pain or pleasure, of one sensation of pressure or of motion to another, is a meaningless jingle of words, unless, indeed, such an expression is used to name figuratively the relations that in and for a comparing, contrasting, uniting and separating, active consciousness two sensation-units are made to bear. Thus, then, this atomic monism brings us no nearer than before to the relation between the data of consciousness and the facts of physical nature. For the rest, how mechanical science can be satisfied to regard its material points as nothing but independently existing fragments of mind, whose whole being is intensive; how, out of these intensive units, space-relations are to be constructed at all—these questions we may for the present neglect. Atomic monism, a synthesis, or, rather, a jumble of physiological psychology with doctrines that are incompatible with any science whatever, has never answered these questions, and doubtless never will. The memory of the *Kritik* is still present to control modern progress, and to recall it, as we may hope, from these most ingenious but most dangerous ventures into dogmatism.

But let us not be over-hasty. There are other forms of monism now extant. The purely materialistic monism, for which the hard and extended atoms of naive realism are already and in themselves potentially mind, the old-fashioned materialism of days when Mind-Stuff and physiological psychology were alike undreamed of, may indeed be neglected. That doctrine needed not critical philosophy, of more than a very undeveloped sort, to do away with it once for all. Modern monism knows of supposed atoms

that are in their ultimate nature psychical, and of supposed psychical forces or agents that, when seen from without, behave much like extended atoms. But the old fragment of matter that, being no more than what every blacksmith knows as matter, was yet to be with all its impenetrability and its inertia a piece of the soul, has been banished from the talk of serious philosophers. There remain, then, the numerous efforts that see in the world the expression of psychical powers as such, not mere mind-stuff atoms, but organized wholes, related in nature to what we know by internal experience as mind, yet higher or lower, subtler or mightier, wiser or more foolish, than the human intelligence. These views may be divided into two classes—those that see in nature the manifestations of a logical or intelligent power, and those that see in it the manifestations of an alogical or blind though still psychical power. Each of these classes again may be subdivided according as the power is conceived as conscious or as unconscious in its working. How do these ontological efforts stand related to the critical thought? Has any one of them escaped from the boundary that Kant set for future thought?

The logical Monism necessarily tends towards the historical method of explaining the world. I say *tends*, because logical Monism, following Kant afar off, may look upon time as what Dr. Stirling calls, in his criticism of Kant, a *mirage*, not belonging to the truth of things. But, in fact, since human intelligence is itself an activity, a working towards an end, and since the logical Monist thinks the universe after the analogy of the human reason, the constant tendency is for him to conceive the world as a process whereby the world-spirit makes actual what was potential, and the world-history therefore as an Evolution. Modern science, in fact, when viewed speculatively, though it does not confirm, yet lends itself easily to such efforts, and we can always, if we choose, imagine the evolution of the organic kingdom as possibly the process of self-manifestation of one eternal reason. Only in this way we are very far from a satisfactory ontology. A world, the manifestation of the universal reason, developing in time, how can any reflective mind be content with this account of things? The universal reason surely means something by its process, surely lacks something when it seeks for higher forms. Now, on a lower stage the universal reason has not

yet what it seeks, on the higher stage it attains what it had not. Whence or how does it obtain this something? What hindered the possible from being forthwith actual at the outset? If there was any hindrance, was this of the same nature with the universal reason, or was it other? If other, then we are plunged into a Dualism, and the good and evil principles appear once more. But if there was no external hindrance, no illogical evil principle in existence, then the universal reason has irrationally gone without the possible perfection that it might possess, until, after great labor, it has made actual what it never ought to have lacked. The infinite Logos thus becomes no more than the "child playing with bubbles" of the old philosopher. Everything about the process of evolution becomes intelligible and full of purpose—except the fact that there should be any process at all where all was in, and of, and for the universal reason at the outset. The infinite power has been playing with perfection as a cat with a mouse, letting it run away a few æons in time, that it might be caught once more in a little chase, involving the history of some millions of worlds of life. Is this a worthy conception? Nay, is it not a self-contradictory one? Evolution and Reason—are they compatible? Yes, indeed, when the evolution is ended, the hurly-burly done, the battle lost and won; but meanwhile—? In short, either evolution is a necessity, one of the twelve-labors of this Hercules-Absolute, or else it is irrational. In the one case the Absolute must be conceived as in bonds, in the other case the Logos must be conceived as blundering. Both conceptions are rank nonsense. This kind of Monism will not satisfy critical demands.

And then there is the other objection, stated by Schopenhauer, and by I know not how many before him, that every historical conception of the world as a whole, every attempt to look upon Being as a process in time, as a perpetual evolution from a lower to a higher, is shattered upon this rock: that after an infinite time the infinite process is still in a very early stage. Infinitely progressing, always growing better, and yet reaching after all this eternity of work, only the incoherent, troublous, blind imperfection that we feel in ourselves, and that we see in every dung-heap and sick-room and government on the earth, in every scattered mass of nebulous matter, in every train of meteor-fragments

in the heavens—what is this but progress without a goal, blind toil? The world would be, one might think, after an infinity of growth, intensively infinite at every point of its extent. We mortals know of no one point in the universe where one might lay his hand and say: *Here the ideal is attained.*

Yet I should be very far from dreaming of accepting the opposing dogmatic theorem, the antithesis of this sublime Antinomy, viz.: "The world is the product of an irrational force. The One is blind." Schopenhauer undertook the defence of this antithesis, and, in bad logic, as we all know, he somewhat surpassed even that arch blunderer, the universal Will of his own system. This Will, after all, desired a good deal of trouble, and got his wish. But Schopenhauer desired a consistent statement, and, with all his admirable ingenuity and learning, he produced a statement whose inconsistencies have been exposed too often to need much more discussion. Schopenhauer is a sort of dealer in deadly weapons. We go to him for a pistol or a knife when our intents are murderous, for he often supplies the most effective means for argumentative success when we want a dialectic victory. He is a literary gardener, too, and sells many very pretty thought-flowers. But an ontology—no, to the defenders of the alogical hypothesis, as a dogmatic doctrine, it has not yet been given to make out more than the purely negative case that we have stated above. Dogmatic panlogism can be assaulted, as I hold, with much show of success. The opposite doctrine has not yet been dogmatically maintained without even worse confusion.

Panlogism and Alogism are difficult enough in themselves, but how much worse becomes their condition when, as in the *Philosophy of the Unconscious*, of Von Hartmann, either one of them, or a hybrid of the two, is burdened with yet another hypothesis, viz.: that the One Being is unconscious, and yet in nature psychical. Founding himself on certain physiological facts, very doubtfully interpreted, on a monstrous perversion of the mathematical theory of probabilities, on an ingenious view of the history of philosophy, on a like ingenious criticism of Kant, Von Hartmann has expounded an ontological doctrine of which, as I cannot but hold, serious thought can make nothing. This unconscious being, existent not for itself, for it knows nothing, nor for others, because all else is a part of it (and, for the rest, nobody ever thought of it before

Von Hartmann), shall be the maker and upholder of the universe. When we regard this product of a fertile brain, we can, I think, only say of it that a philosophy of round squares may be an entertaining problem for a winter's evening, but cannot be taken very seriously. This discussion of the Unconscious is no genuine philosophical cookery; only a kind of making of mud pies, useful, no doubt, as a cultivation of industry.

Of course the previous criticism is absurdly inadequate to the magnitude of the problems involved, and is intended only as the merest sketch, dogmatically stated, of critical objections to ontology. Seeming irreverence, in this hasty style of doing battle, must be pardoned. Only against dogmatic metaphysic as such do I war. The critical philosophy holds no theoretical opinion sacred, just as it regards no earnest, practical faith as other than sacred. The question is here not what we are to believe, but what we can in argument maintain, and what our method of search ought to be. Absolute and Infinite, Logos and not Logos, Mind-Stuff and Spirit—what are they all for critical philosophy but, in the first place, mere ideas, conceptions of reason, to be mercilessly analyzed without regard for consequences?

One way remains whereby the panlogical monism can still hope to reach a satisfactory statement of the world-problem. Suppose that, once for all, the historical form of statement is abandoned. This may be done in either of two ways. The universal reason may be conceived as manifesting itself in time, but not in a series of events that are united as the parts of a single process. The world-life may be conceived not as a single history, but as an eternally repeated expression of the One reason, a process ever renewed as soon as finished, an infinite series of growing and decaying worlds—worlds that are like the leaves of the forest, that spring and wither through an eternity of changing seasons. The rationality of the world-process is thus saved for our thought by the hypothesis that reason is not like a belated traveller, wandering through the night of time, seeking for a self-realization that is never reached, but, rather, like the sun that each day begins afresh his old task, rejoicing as a giant in the fulness of his attained power. Whoever regards the world as it now is as a sufficient expression of infinite reason, is at liberty to accept this hypothesis; but he must not expect to convince those of his doctrine to

whom reason means perfection, and to whom the world will not appear as just at present more perfect than the world of *Candide's* experiences. For every one but the blind optimist there is difficulty in regarding this wind-swept battle-field of human action as the fitting theatre for a drama of unhindered infinite reason, to be repeated with unwearying tautology through an unending future. Thus, then, we are tossed back and forth between the possibilities suggested by our hypothesis. "*The world is the manifestation of infinite reason;*" good, then, but how? "*The world is a rational growth from lower to higher.*" How, then, is this possible if the infinite reason rules all and desires the higher? Was it not always at the goal? So, then: "*The world is not one process merely, but an eternal repetition of the drama of infinite reason, which, as infinite, is thus always active and always at the goal.*" But this hypothesis is utterly overthrown by the appearance of the least imperfection or irrationality in nature. The first starving family, or singed moth, or broken troth, or wasted effort, or wounded bird, is an indictment of the universal reason that, always at the goal, has as goal this irrational wrong. The other possible hypothesis leaves us, after all, in the same quandary. Time may be a mere "mirage." For the eternal One there is, then, no process; only fact. This notion of a timeless Being is, no doubt, very well worth study. It is the Prometheus that steals fire from the critical philosophy itself. But, then, the eternal One is thus always at the goal, just as in the other case. The One cannot be infinite and rational and yet coexistent with the least trace of wrong, absurdity, error, falsehood. Again our Monism fails.

The one objection thus far urged against all these doctrines is, not that they are pleasing or displeasing, but that they involve contradiction. But if they did not involve inner contradiction, what then? Would any one of them be established? No, the terrible passage through the gates of the Kantian Dialektik would remain for each, and over the door of the critical philosophy is written: "Abandon all hope, ye dogmatic theories of Being that enter here." The great problems of the theory of knowledge would demand solution. How the individual mind, shut up in a world of sense, of momentary judgments, of dim memories and expectations, of slowly-moving, discursive reasonings, can possibly

know and grasp this all-enfolding Unity of Being, can distinguish the conception of it from any chance product of imagination, can reach the heart of things, although by nature living, as Lotze has remarked, in the uttermost branchings of reality—this is the great mystery that critical philosophy seeks to remove by denying the premises upon which the belief in this mystery rests, viz. : the possibility of an Ontology, and the supposed nature of the ideal absolute knowledge. Critical philosophy knows, as Mr. Shadworth Hodgson says, nothing of an Ontology, but much of a Metaphysic.

Thus, then, modern thought, with all its labor, remains as far from an Ontology as ever. We need, in fact, only glance at the efforts made in our own time to prove the existence of independent things in themselves of any sort, in order to see how ill ontological speculation fares. To assure us not what these things are, but that they are, modern thought toils in vain. One admits that uncritical consciousness accepts things in themselves; but one fails to learn how this uncritical consciousness is justified. Who can be content with Mr. Spencer's transfigured Realism? A more critical writer, Professor Baumann, of Göttingen, in his *Philosophie als Orientirung über die Welt*, elaborately shows the impossibility of establishing the existence of an external reality, and then assumes things after the fashion of the most downright and simple every-day realism, simply because of the "unavoidable desire for explanation" that dwells in us. Idealism cannot, as he thinks, explain, but only describe, our inner experiences. Realism can do something in the way of explanation. Explanation by means of a myth is an old device of mankind; but how about explanation by means of a conscious myth? Professor Riehl, in his book, *Der Philosophische Kriticismus*, defends the realistic element in Kant from all assaults, and seems to regard as a sufficient proof of an independent reality the fact that we cannot trace the whole of consciousness to the action of the subjective forms of sense and understanding. And there be numerous thinkers whose realism is founded on a verbal quibble about appearance implying something that appears (a quibble, by the way, to which Kant's own words, in a few passages, have given countenance). But in all this there is no argument for the existence of things in themselves so strong as the loneliness that enters the minds of many people when you take the things in themselves away.

Thus, then, without an ontology, without proofs founded upon solid ground for even the first elements of an ontology, modern speculation turns back to Kant to see what hope there is that a new edifice is possible on a Kantian basis. To be sure, in Kant himself there was the old obscurity about the things in themselves not yet removed, but mayhap in the *Kritik* the way has been shown whereby this, its own disease, can be remedied.

II.—*The Needed Reform of the Critical Philosophy.*

What modification of the elaborate system of the *Kritik* is needed in order that we may substitute for these tumultuous assemblies of quarrelling ontologies, these famine-riots of hungry Being-hunters, an orderly organization of critical doctrines, related to one principle, and conscious both of their limits and of their attainments? To this question we must devote the brief remainder of our sketch.

The fundamental thought of the *Kritik*, the one that we all take away from its study, however vague our notion of the details of the system, is the thought that the forms and laws of the universe as known to us are conditioned by the nature of our own knowing activity. But how conditioned? Here begins the difficulty. Two main problems are thus suggested: First, if we accept the fundamental critical thought, what can we say of the relation of this knowing activity to its matter? How can and does the knowing activity form or affect its matter? Second, what can be said of the matter upon which the knowing activity operates, when we view this matter apart from the activity that affects it? Is the matter anything apart from the forming activity? If so, what is it? These two problems, themselves but opposite faces of one problem, cannot be treated wholly apart, and yet fall asunder when you try to combine them into one. Let us begin with the first.

Given a crude conscious experience of sense, and given also, as we may for mere argument's sake suppose, this experience as already in the subjective forms of space and time, by what action can this experience be transformed into a knowledge of a real universe? Or, in other words, what active element, added to sense, makes of it knowledge? Modern science, following Locke, says reflection, the noting and comparing of the data of this sense-

experience. This reflection is something foreign to the direct experience, but follows after experience, noting with the devotion of a Boswell the words that sense may utter. No, says Kant, this cannot be; a mere Boswell cannot introduce into sense more necessity than its data already possess, and they possess none. An active power, applying categories by means of the transcendental Schema, making of sense for the first time true experience, not merely sucking in like a sponge the pre-existent waters of experience, introduces necessity into this confused manifold of sense. But still we ask, How? The transcendental deduction and the system of principles are to furnish the answer. And this answer of Kant's *Kritik* seems to have satisfied comparatively few thinkers, even among those that accept the critical thought, in its general statement, with readiness. One great class of objections we may find summed up in Dr. Stirling's late Kant articles in the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*. Take these objections in concrete form as applied to one problem, that of causal necessity.

The assertion of causal necessity is the assertion that there are throughout experience cases of existences upon which certain other existences must always follow whenever the first occur. Now what is this conception of causal necessity if not applied to experience? By Kant's own confession it is nothing. But how can it be applicable to experience? Only in case sense-experience itself furnishes instances of uniform succession. But if sense-experience furnishes these instances, what does the category of causality, applied through its schema, add to them? The idea of necessity? But this idea is empty if sense does not justify it, superfluous if sense does justify it by containing the desired uniformities. Experience either has regular sequence—and then why the category?—or has not regular sequence, and then the category is as helpless as a hen with her brood of ducklings. The hen's transcendental schema contains the idea of water as fatal to her brood, and her sense-experience contains the perception of her brood as thriving in water. Alas, poor category! Sense and understanding, thus regarded, are like fragments of rare but broken china, which we in vain try to piece together.

A more or less clear notion of this objection has driven certain eminent scientific men, who (as E. Dühring maliciously said) *ein*

wenig philosopheln, to a kind of modification of the Kantian view, so plausible that to me, I confess, it once for a time seemed the true Kant, and to others less ignorant it doubtless still seems the last word of philosophy on the subject. According to this view, the category of causality is applied to sense-data by active intelligence merely as a "Postulate of Comprehensibility," a sort of demand, or an humble petition, as it were, to his majesty experience, that he will be pleased to be uniform, since otherwise we shall be unable to do anything with him or his data. An humble petition of the before-mentioned hen, that the water will be graciously pleased to drown her ducklings, would be a fair instance of the "Postulate of the Comprehensibility of the World" as thus stated. If this postulate means that we shall be delighted to find in the world what uniformity we can find, it is an innocent wish. If it means that without uniformities experience can furnish no laws, it is a tautology. If it means that by this postulate we render one whit more probable (not to say necessary) the actual existence of uniformities in future experience, then it is a manifest error. There are the sense-data, here is the intelligence "postulating" about them. Postulate me no postulates, says sense. I go my own way unharmed by you. And sense does so. Nothing can be clearer than that in this way the active intelligence does not affect the sense-data at all, nor create the least show of a law of nature. Yet, Kant said, the understanding is to give laws to nature. How?

Mr. Shadworth Hodgson, attacking this great problem, assumes not an understanding affecting a sense-experience, but a primary consciousness in time and space forms, subjected to a sort of retroversion called reflection, and to a sort of dissection called the conceptual process, whereby the data of continuous direct consciousness are distinguished, represented, separated, classified, named, and so made into a complex thought-structure. This theory regards necessity as having, after all, its foundation in the simple data of primary consciousness, in which, if there were no uniformity, active reflection could introduce none. An effort is, however, made to regard the stream of consciousness as nevertheless certainly subject to the law of uniformity of sequence; but readers of the *Philosophy of Reflection* may judge whether this effort is successful. For my part, no account of the principle of

causality which sees in it only a particular instance of the principle of identity can satisfy my needs. The assertion, *events of the class A are followed by events of the class B*, cannot possibly be reduced to an identical assertion unless it is such at the outset. Nor can any reflective collection of data from a series of passively given conscious states be warrant for this assertion if it is to apply universally to all possible series of conscious states. Mr. Hodgson is doubtless one of the greatest living masters of metaphysic, but we must suspect anything that looks like giving up the very central citadel of the critical philosophy, the doctrine of the spontaneity of intelligence. "We can think nothing as united in the object that we have not ourselves united." Those are Kant's golden words. By them we yet hold, though the mechanism of this *uniting* still seems questionable.

Mr. Caird and Professor Watson (whose new book, *Kant and his English Critics*, has come into my hands since I began to write the present paper) have attempted to overcome this difficulty by building beyond Kant's separation of sense and understanding up to the point where sense and understanding are seen to unite into one fact with two aspects. Sense, they say, is not given apart from thought, to be conquered by thought from without. The categories do not come to the sense-data as the water to the woman. The fact given is a manifold of sense and category indissolubly joined. Kant's discovery really is that sense apart from thought-forms is impossible. Kant's mistake it is that he speaks of sense and thought as if they were two separate streams. We must reform him by making of the two one flesh, not through the act of knowledge put already in it.

I have no doubt that these thinkers have properly suggested the direction in which we must look for the solution of the problem, but I am not convinced that thought can so readily swallow sense in the way that Professor Caird seems to suggest. Kant's error lay, no doubt, in supposing sense to be a datum wholly apart from the active setting of the house in order through the category. Sense once thus given, how could the category rearrange its facts? Sense either would be in itself conformable to the category, and would so need no rearrangement, or would be at variance with the category, and then inexorable. But still the fact remains that we are constantly bound to sense-facts, and that there is in

consciousness a contrast between the passive reception of sense-data (*e. g.*, of locomotive-whistles, of toothaches, or of the sounds of hand-organs) and the spontaneity of thought. How explain this contrast and yet give the spontaneity its rights? Let us make one more attempt.

What is the ultimate fact of intelligent or knowing consciousness? Is this consciousness wholly a receiving, or wholly a making, of its own content? If wholly, neither is it yet in part each, and so both at once? Both at once, answer many Kantian thinkers. But how both, and in what sense each? First, then, something is received, and by the word *received* I mean no implication about a cause or source from which received; I mean only to point out the fact that in every moment of knowing there is a sense of the positive irresistible presence of some sense-content, a presence wholly unquestionable, absolutely certain. A toothache, a blue color, a loud sound, a vague feeling of weariness, explain them as you will, in consciousness the data signified by these words are, when present at all, in and for any instant of their actual presence simply irresistible facts. There is in these facts, as facts, no conscious spontaneity of thought. The unconscious *non fingo*. In the second place, if the sense-data of any moment have the form of space, they have this form also as a simple irresistible fact, such as Dr. William James has aptly called a spatial *Quale*. Geometrical theorems, even geometrical axioms, in general the relations of what Mr. Hodgson names Figured Space, are never such ultimate data, but the mere fact of spatial *bigness* (to follow Dr. James once more) is a possible ultimate datum. Again, besides these data of space-form, succession in its simplest form, not the relation of past, present, and future, but the relation of instantaneous sequence, such as you may observe in the ticks of a watch or the beats of your pulse when you pay direct attention to them, and perceive immediately, without the conscious use of memory, the present fact of a succession of three or four distinct beats, this is also an ultimate datum. But now, in the third place, besides the sense-data and their ultimate forms of extensive and successive magnitude, there is present in the moment of knowing an active judgment. What does this do to the sense-data more than to be conscious of them? The following thing I answer: the intelligent act does, if no more. Take up the thread of knowing conscious-

ness where you will, and you find in every moment when there is knowledge a reference, more or less definite and significant, of the content here given to something beyond this present moment. But this something beyond need by no means be an external cause of the present sense-datum. On the contrary, the notion of an external cause seems to me a very complex product of thought, impossible without an earlier, simpler, ultimate tendency to refer the present datum to something beyond the present. What is this something? First, and simplest of all of the forms that are taken by the active judgment upon a present datum, is the form of referring this present to a past datum. In every act of reflection, in all definite memory, in clearly conscious recognition, in every assertion of a uniformity in experience, there is present in consciousness, first, the sum of immediate data; second, the form of extensive or successive magnitude taken by these present data; third, the assertion that these data, or a part of them, stand for, symbolize, recall, resemble, or otherwise relate to data that were real in a past experience now no longer existent. Plainly these present data are no proof of the existence of a past. Plainly, as present, they are not the past that they symbolize. Plainly, then, the past is no sense-datum. But notice, the whole of experience, except the meagre little sense-datum of this moment, is past. Hence, experience is possible as an object of knowledge only in and for the act by which the past is created, as it were, out of the material of present data. This act of asserting more than our data can possibly contain, by projecting from the present moment the scheme of a well-filled actual past, no longer existent or directly knowable, but simply made by the judgment—this act I call the act of *Acknowledgment of the Past*.

But acknowledgment of a reality beyond present data is not confined to the assertion of a past. Reference of present data to a future forms a second class of acts which may be called *Anticipations*. Reference of present data to external reality, in the acknowledgment of other conscious beings besides ourselves as real, and of other experience besides our own as possible, in brief, *Acknowledgment of a Universe of Truth*, forms the third class of conscious acts by which present sense-data are transcended through a reference of them to a reality of which in themselves

they give, and can give, not the faintest evidence. And through these three classes or forms of activity, experience as a whole is created. Experience beyond this instant is for sense nothing, for active thought everything. Thus, then, it is true both that sense is beyond the control of judgment, and that in the activity of judging we build upon the data of sense the whole universe of reality. Thus, then, the objection that the category comes to the sense-experience too late to give it any necessity is evaded altogether by a new conception of experience. Sense-facts do not follow in a given order, in a presented time, to be reflected upon and rearranged later by an officious understanding. The true fact is that sense is momentary, and fills no past at all; so that the whole of time is made and filled up by an understanding that gets its cue from present sense, but that acts in its own way, actually constructing, body, bones, and soul, out of the little dry dust of the puny present moment, that whole vast world of experience to which Kant had supposed that it was merely to give form.

This account differs from Kant's in some important respects, although it is an effort merely to recast the Kantian doctrine. Kant said that, in order for the succession of sense-impressions to become an object of thought, the synthesis of apprehension and the synthesis of recognition must take up the sense-data, and, while uniting them, must make them appear in consciousness as real, and as members of the united experience. The view here maintained is that the past data, instead of being picked up, as it were, by the synthesis of apprehension and of recognition, and carried bodily into present consciousness, are really projected out of the present data, into a conceived past, by the momentary activity of judgment. Kant made the unity of apperception, like a sea-fog, enter, pervade, float through, and fill experience, so that the categories could work, and so that a disunited experience could become one. Our view would make all the world of reality immediately subject to a unity implied in that present act by which this world is projected from the present into a conceived but not given infinite space and time. Like Kant, we should regard activity that is not concerned with sense-data as empty, and the sense-data themselves as blind; but we should maintain that an utter divorce of sense and intelligence is not only meaningless, but impossible.

If this is the solution suggested for the problem of the relation of form and matter in consciousness, the other question—that about the nature of the matter when viewed apart from the form—will detain us little. The three impostors of the Kantian *Kritik* (impostors because they so well deceived Kant himself), whose names are *Ding an sich*, *transcendentaler Gegenstand*, and *Noumenon*, vanish into thin air. The *Ding an sich* was what sense became when you left out the form first, and then the matter, and then put a “*selbstverständliche Voraussetzung*”¹ in the place to fill up the empty space. The *transcendentaler Gegenstand*, or *Ding überhaupt*, was precisely what one thinks of when one thinks of nothing. The *Noumenon* was what a being with a totally different form of sense from our own would perceive if he turned his attention to the *transcendentaler Gegenstand*. Peace to the ashes of these noble objects of critical reverence. I hold the true critical theory of Reality to be thus briefly summed up :

1. Real is the sense-content of the present moment.

2. Real is the form of this content in the extensive or in the successive order.

3. Real is the act by which we acknowledge a past that is not given, nor now existent as having been ; real is the act by which we acknowledge the existence of other consciousness than the individual consciousness, other possible experience in space and time than the given experience ; real is the act by which we anticipate a future not yet given.

4. For the objects of these acts no possible theoretical evidence can be given more nearly ultimate than the one great fact that through acknowledgment and anticipation they are projected from the present moment into the past, future, and possible world of truth, conceived as in space and time, and as the object of actual or possible consciousness.

5. No other reality is conceivable than that contained in these data and in these acts of projection. For to conceive of a reality is to perform an act of projection.

6. Apart from the act of projection, no reality is attributable to the objects that are not data. For to attribute reality to them is

¹ V. Benno Erdmann, “*Kant's Kritikismus in der ersten u. in der zweiten Auflage der Kritik*,” *passim*.

to acknowledge or to anticipate them—*i. e.*, to perform an act of what I have called projection from the present moment.

7. At the same time no doubt can be entertained of the existence of the objects in question; for doubt is inability to acknowledge or to anticipate. But as a fact we do acknowledge and anticipate just these objects.

8. Real are, therefore, the objects of the intelligent activity just in so far as they are products of this activity of projection. For that is real for us whose existence is for us indubitable.

9. The great object of critical philosophy is, therefore, not to toil in the vain hope of constructing an ontology, but to devote itself to the study of the forms of intellectual activity, with a view to separating in these the insignificant from the significant. The concrete content of space and time is the subject of special science.

10. The goal of philosophy can be reached only in an Ethical Doctrine. For since the ultimate fact of the knowing consciousness is the active construction of a world of truth from the data of sense, the ultimate justification of this activity must be found in the significance—*i. e.*, in the moral worth—of this activity itself, a matter only to be discussed in the light of Ethics.

Such is the modification that the writer would suggest as bringing the Kantian thought more into harmony with the present needs of philosophic progress. Only a very few problems have been considered, but these are fundamental. I had wished in this paper to discuss the relation of the Kantian thought to that other problem of modern discussion, whose roots are in the transcendental æsthetic and its branches everywhere (even in spiritualistic newspapers); I mean the great problem of the nature of space-knowledge. Here one of our greatest steps forward is plainly soon to be taken; and Kant is the author of the whole controversy, although, indeed, not responsible for the spiritualistic phase, of which Slade and Professor Zöllner are the sole beggetters. I had wished also to trace the Kantian influence in some of the discussions of modern psychology, and even to point out how, as in the physiological doctrine of "specific energies," Kant, half-understood and quite misused, has often acted as an awakening force, a source of suggestion, in sciences that lie far beyond the boundary of his own chosen work. But all this wish was plainly foolish

for I have far exceeded proper limits already, without half treating the few fragments of doctrine that I have attempted to discuss. The one conclusion that this paper has in a very hasty way tried to maintain, is that the critical philosophy, as a negative assault upon all ontological dogmatism of the theoretical reason, still stands fast, and that progress therefore lies in a reform of the Kantian *Kritik* by means of a new and yet more critical definition of experience and of the work of thought.

KANT'S ANTINOMIES IN THE LIGHT OF MODERN SCIENCE.

READ AT SARATOGA, JULY 6, 1881, BY LESTER F. WARD.

It has become fashionable to regard all controversy as mere logomachy, in which some mere word is the true "bone of contention."

"And for the word itself we fight
In bitterness of soul."

This view finds strong support in the undeniable fact that the intensity of sectarian antagonism increases in proportion as the essential doctrines of sects approach each other, until, as well stated by an able writer in "Macmillan's Magazine," "if you want to see men fling away the very thought of reconciliation, and close in internecine conflict, you should look at controversialists who *do not differ at all*, but who have adopted different words to express the same opinion." Such views are strengthened not only by facts of every-day observation, but by such memorable events of history as the two greatest schisms in Christianity, the first arising from the attempt to add a single letter to the Nicene shibboleth, and the second growing out of the appending of a word to the Latin creed.

But while admitting that a large amount of human controversy is of this more or less verbal character, a deeper study of human nature cannot fail to reveal glimpses of more general causes which may even be found to underlie the apparently most base-